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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the prosperous post-World War II period, the typical Ameri-
can consumer paid little attention to the major issues involved in
international trade discussion. Given widespread approval of the
general theories of laissez-faire market process, discussion of any
aspect of international trade naturally assumed that unrestrained
trade was ideal. Certainly consumers understood that competitive
forces would mean that some customers or suppliers were at all
times in the process of being eliminated in the market struggle.
Nonetheless, it was felt that the free exercise of supply and de-
mand in competitive situations would lead to lower prices, better
quality of goods and better international relations for all.
In fact, however, the normal laissez-faire relations between sup-
ply and demand were not dominating international market activ-
ity. Insofar as the supply consisted of basic, nondiscriminatory
resources which had been developed, or of capital invested for
war or other nationalistic reasons (in many cases with technology
and capital previously supplied by multinational corporations), the
facilities were more than adequate for the market. Thus, each
good could be treated as offered in an elastic market. In this
market, all producers attempted to utilize their fixed capital to its
fullest extent to enjoy the advantages of decreasing costs, so long
as the market price for the product covered the variable costs.
Each attempt by an individual supplier to increase his particular
market share tended to be matched by that of other suppliers,
resulting in minimal prices. Consequently, demand for these stan-
dardized products was the dominant factor in the market relation-
ship. The supplier was forced to face competitive pressure while
those on the demand side of the market equation enjoyed a period
of good bargain/purchasing power.
Over time, the blind assumption of post-World War II American
consumers that laissez-faire economic forces in the world market
place would forever be translated into economic advantages for
the American market, proved to be neither accurate nor possible.
Multinational economic policy, responding to nationalistic activi-
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ties and economic realities, inordinately modified the short run ad-
vantage. In the long run, producing facilities must be closed when
full costs are not being met.
In this same post-war period, workers in the supply end of the
market place began to improve their real wage levels. These
workers then fulfilled Engel's law .and sought for themselves and
their families more than minimal subsistence levels of goods and
services, which in turn increased local demand. The emergence of
these economically viable market factors meant that additional
world demand had become effective, exerting upward pressure on
the prices of world products. As the economic relationships were
brought back into balance, the resultant readjustment forced the
American consumer to recognize a significant interest in the
resolution of major issues regarding international trade. The spec-
tacular rise in the price of such basic materials as oil, coffee,
cocoa, along with products such as steel, textiles, television sets
and automobiles (to name a few internationally traded items), has
become of basic economic and general conversational concern.
No longer can an American worker assume that decreased costs
of production will improve his standard of living without a corre-
sponding increase in his productivity. In fact, the American con-
sumer has begun to experience Engel's law in reverse: as real
incomes fall, more income will be spent on necessities. Households
have discovered that price increases in the domestic market tend
to parallel those occurring in the international market. In fact, de-
mand for items at the middle of the scale of wants is apparently
rising faster than that for items which generally appeal to the lux-
ury and optional purchase sectors of the economy. Decreases in
effective demand have also affected the pattern of the luxury
market at the same time that newly effective world markets have
compounded the demand for middle level necessities. Therefore,
while the American consumer has conscientiously cut back on his
budget, real and growing pressure on that budget has not been
relieved.
II. THE TOKYO ROUND
As this consumer interest in international trade emerged, nego-
tiators representing 99 nations labored on what was called the
Tokyo Round of International Trade Agreements, aimed at liber-
alizing world commerce and modifying the tendency toward pro-
tectionism in signatory countries. After five years of negotiations,
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the parties reached a preliminary position agreement which was
initialed on April 12, 1979.** Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974,
Congress will either vote "yes" or "no" without amendments
when the Tokyo Round implementing legislation is presented for
ratification.
A. Tariff Reduction and the Effect of Tariffs
on Consumer Interests
As has been true in past trade agreements, one of the key
aspects of the Tokyo Round is the percentage of rise or fall in the
general tariff rates contained in the agreement, or the amount of
protection (or lack of it) that is to be enjoyed by specific indus-
tries. The Tokyo Round continued the tradition of tariff reduction
initiated by the last major revision, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT), which had reduced tariff levels
by an announced average of about 35 percent. This provision was
included in part because such tariff reduction is easily identifiable,
as well as quantifiable. The average reduction for the thousands of
items involved might be 35 to 38 percent scaled in over the next
eight years with a check at the end of five years. But it should be
noted that this is a reduction beyond the 35 percent reduction con-
tained in the GATT agreement. Therefore, the second 35 percent
is in actual dollar terms considerably less than a full 35 percent of
some original base tariff barrier. The 35 percent reduction will be
honored between the 22 industrial countries, and there will be
smaller cuts for developing nations who decide to sign the agree-
ment. For those nations which do not sign, the most-favored-
nation status enjoyed under GATT will no longer be effective.
In the context of laissez-faire economic analysis, tariff reduc-
tions affect the domestic consumer by lowering the price of im-
ported goods. In turn, domestic goods prices must respond to the
increased supply available in the market. The new equilibrium of
price and quantity available can be expected to be of indisputable
benefit to the consumer.
But the analysis cannot end with the effect of tariffs on the
price mechanism. At the same time that the consumer faces high
prices as a result of tariffs, he is also being taxed to support the
present government bureaucracy needed to enforce existing tariff
rules and regulations (a problem which will, unfortunately, be in-
creased by the Tokyo Round agreements).
** See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
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Not only do tariffs on any level harm the general consumer;
they are also a serious problem for the businesses involved. Cost
control may prove difficult for a firm protected by tariff barriers
since there is little pressure to force better economic behavior.
Sloppy management, padded wages, wasted resources, and ineffi-
cient use of capital become acceptable practices for company oper-
ation. If profits are low, the International Trade Commission and
members of Congress can again be solicited with supporting docu-
ments to raise tariff barriers by an additional amount. Powerful
supporting groups form to lobby for this result. Management, labor
and capital representatives gather in an attempt to influence the
outcome. Senators and Representatives are inundated with input
from these sources and soon are caught in a very difficult position.
The tariff bills resulting when the various pressure groups have
been appeased have, not inappropriately, been called "Christmas
Trees." Relying on a tariff barrier becomes a way of life for some
of its recipients and supporters.
The lowering of tariff barriers will affect all industries to a
degree, but it should affect the import sensitive fields the most.
For industries such as automobiles, textiles and rubber, where in-
ternational alternatives are available, import tariff reductions will
have a serious impact on jobs and investment. The relaxation by
the United States of tariff restrictions on Canadian automotive
goods in the early 1970's profoundly affected the pattern and use
of automobile facilities within the United States. The whiskey in-
dustry has already started considering the impact of the new
agreement on the location of whiskey bottlers.
B. Subsidies
The opposite economic effect can be shown for the over 800 non-
tariff barriers for which the Tokyo Round considered and
developed codes.t In this context an alternative product for the
international market is fostered by some artificial financial or ad-
ministrative support, usually by the host governmental units.
Among these devices is the practice of many countries in granting
internal subsidies to vital, basic domestic firms. In many of these
cases, the subsidy is a make-work situation. It keeps facilities
operating and men employed which would otherwise be idle. In
some respects it is the continuation of the concept of a short run
international price for a basic supply that does not reflect the full
t Id at 153.
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cost of the product. With a subsidy equal to the fixed costs, the
firm can bid internationally to cover its variable costs and thus
offer lower prices. The consumers of the receiving nation are then
able in time to lower their cost of living.
The codes contained in the Tokyo Round are expected to limit
the international aspect of these subsidies, but marginal cases will
certainly develop and will need to be referred for rulings to the
improved GATT settlement procedures. Among these problem
areas will be the issues of nationalized companies in countries
with centralized governments, regional development companies in
economically depressed areas, government credit schemes to
assist in countervailing activities for recessions, and "infant indus-
tries." In each of these cases, the domestic subsidy is granted to
give a firm economic support for a short period so that it can grow
domestically. It is assumed that each producer offers a product
that will enable it to increase its market penetration and achieve a
profitable position, and that at some point in time the subsidy will
be dropped. However, as the industry becomes a viable unit, it
will begin to enter the international market. Disputes will develop
on the manner of distinguishing legitimate domestic subsidies
from illegal international subsidies. The present GATT list of pro-
hibited export subsidies is not all-inclusive and is badly out of
date. Additionally, the issue of indirect taxes levied within coun-
tries (as used by the EEC) will remain controversial.
C. Removal of Barriers to Trade in Agricultural Products
The Tokyo Round has also resulted in an agreement to lower
barriers in foreign markets to American food producers. This will
introduce the world pricing system into the American agricultural
market. Domestic agricultural supports, while costly, have cre-
ated excessive supplies which in the domestic market have gener-
ally led to lower overall market prices. The resulting high standard
of living has been a matter of pride for all Americans. As the
foreign barriers are removed from American agricultural pro-
ducts such as turkey parts, table grapes, canned fruit, and orange
juice, the average price in the American food market will climb
considerably.
D. Government Procurement
The Tokyo Round has succeeded in opening some portions of
governmental procurement procedures so that specific items are
19791
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
up for bidding by foreign suppliers, breaking new ground not
specifically covered in GATT. Although the specific standards are
presently under negotiation, and Japan has been publicly men-
tioned as officially protesting the attempt to open its tele-com-
munications field for foreign bids, the concept of alternative bids
as a way of holding down the end price of contracts has great ap-
peal for both consumers and taxpayers. At the present time, this
modification of bidding procedure is expected to open up about
$10 billion of the $79 billion in American federal government con-
tracts to foreign suppliers.
E. Standards and Customs Valuation
Parallel to the issue of governmental purchasing are the agree-
ments reached in the Tokyo Round to permit the setting of com-
mon standards and to simplify customs procedures and ad-
ministration. The utilization of artificial barriers such as excessive
standards testing, unrealistic safety tests, impossible labeling re-
quirements, import licensing procedures, bureaucratic delays, and
"uplifting" valuation standards for customs duties (especially the
"American Selling Price" system of evaluation) will be eliminated.
It is therefore hoped that the flow of economically viable products
will be assisted, to the benefit of consumers. Nevertheless, it
should be pointed out that the Kennedy Round of the 1960's in-
cluded some of these same provisions, which were then found
unacceptable to the United States Congress.
III. CONCLUSION
The tariff reductions and regulation of nontariff barriers pur-
portedly achieved by the Tokyo Round should result in a more ef-
fective utilization of the factors of American production. This in
turn, to the benefit of consumers, will improve the overall status
of the economy.
On balance, the agreements progress toward, but fall short of,
adequate measures to reduce trade barriers. They include little if
any control over the actions of multinational corporations whose
price, quantity and allocation policies increasingly tend to in-
validate the laissez-faire underpinnings of international trade law.
Furthermore, the dissatisfaction of developing countries and the
elimination of most-favored-nation status for nonsignatories may
well result in the division of the world into competing trade
groups, a development which could erode the efficiency measures
[Vol. 9:229
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achieved by the Tokyo Round. From the consumer point of view,
considerable vigilance and additional work must precede any truly
satisfactory international mechanism for the elimination of trade
barriers.
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